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Increasing-returns-to-scale imperfect competition trade models predict a more  than 
proportionate relationship between the larger country’s share in world endowments and its 
share in producing firms: the so called home market effect (HME). While this result plays a 
key role in empirical testing, its theoretical foundation typically posits a linear, friction-free 
and perfectly competitive outside sector. Replacing this assumption with firm heterogeneity 
and Melitz (2003) type selection-into-exporting, we demonstrate the existence of a weak and 
a strong HME. The HMEs are generally non-linear; they are magnified by lower trade costs or 
more pronounced productivity dispersion. The weak version of the HME continues to hold for 
general sampling distributions and if the conventional sorting condition fails. In terms of 
demand shares, a HME holds if demand shocks are due to endowment shocks but reverses in 
the case of productivity shocks. Finally and in contrast to the model with an outside sector, 
trade liberalization leads to convergence of real per capita income. 
JEL-Code: F120, R120. 
Keywords: home market effect, monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, economic 
geography. 
 
   
 
   
Gabriel Felbermayr 
Ifo Institute and Leibniz-Institute for 
Economic Research at the 
University of Munich 
Poschingerstraße 5 
Germany – 81679 Munich 
felbermayr@ifo.de 
Benjamin Jung 
University of Tübingen 
Economics Department 
Nauklerstraße 47 




December 22, 2011 
We are grateful to Costas Arkolakis, Daniel Bernhofen, Johannes Bröcker, Jonathan Eaton, 
Carsten Eckel, Peter Egger, Udo Kreickemeier, Mario Larch, and Horst Raff for discussion 
and suggestions, as  well as to seminar participants at the  Munich-Tübingen International 
Economics  Workshop 2011, the  GEP-ifo conference 2011, and at the Universities of 
Bielefeld, Kiel, and Mainz for comments. 1 Motivation
Policymakersandthepublicareconcernedabouttherelativesize oftheireconomies.
This is most clearly visible in the discussion about the increase of the relative weight
of emerging countries.1 New Trade Theory (Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman,
1985) provides a theoretical rationale. With trade costs, product differentiation, in-
creasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm-level, and imperfect competition, the relative
sizeofcountries(orregions)affectsindustrialstructureandwelfare. Inthosemodels,
ﬁrmsprefertolocateinthelargercountry,ceterisparibus,sincethisallowsthemajor-
ity of sales to be carried out without incurring transportation costs. The larger coun-
try supports, in equilibrium, the production of a more-than-proportionate number
of differentiated varieties.
The prediction that the larger country produces an overproportional share of dif-
ferentiated goods is known as the Home Market Effect (HME). Helpman and Krug-
man (1985) and much of the following literature derive the HME using a two-sector
two-country single-factor (labor) model. The framework has a two-tier CES struc-
ture. There is a differentiated goods sector featuring increasing returns to scale, mo-
nopolistic competition, and iceberg trade costs. And there is a linear outside sec-
tor producing a freely traded homogeneous good under perfect competition, which
is assumed to be active (no diversiﬁcation). The HME appears robust to allowing
for a non-CES demand structure (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005), for oligopolis-
tic rather than monopolistic market structure (Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 2001),
for many differentiated goods sectors (Hanson and Xiang, 2004), for the existence of
multinational ﬁrms (Larch, 2007) or for more than two trading countries (Behrens,
Lamorgese, Ottaviano and Tabuchi, 2009). Also, as shown by Helpman and Krugman
(1985),onecanhavemorethanonefactorofproductioniftheproductiontechnology
is homothetic.
The assumption of the linear outside sector is more critical. It contributes to the
analytical tractability of the model. Factor prices are pinned down by technology in
the outside sector. Thus, as long as the equilibrium is diversiﬁed, factor prices (i.e.,
thewagerates)areinsensitive tochangesinmodelparameters. Theassumptionmay,
however, not be innocuous. Davis (1998) introduces trade costs into the outside sec-
tor. He shows that, when transport costs are identical for both types of goods, the
HME vanishes. The HME re-emerges only if relative costs of trading differentiated
goods are unusually high. The usual modeling of the outside sector implies a per-
fectly elastic supply of labor to the increasing returns sector so that the higher at-
tractiveness of the larger economy as a location of production of differentiated goods
is not offset by an increase in the wage rate. If the wage does adjust, the HME can
be dampened or can even disappear (Head and Mayer, 2004). Crozet and Trionfetti
1In a special report, The Economist (Sept 24, 2011) argues “The shift in economic power from West
to East is accelerating ... The rich world will lose some of its privileges”. It provides examples of policy
makers’ obsession with “grandeur and decline” and China “Becoming number one”.
2(2008) have qualiﬁed this prediction.2 They introduce Armington differentiation and
trade costs into the outside sector, nesting Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Davis
(1998). Their numerical results suggests that the HME survives but becomes non-
linear.
Due to its prevalence in models of increasing returns to scale models, it has been
used as a discriminating criterion to test for the validity of New Trade Theory in em-
pirical work (Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003).3 Results are mixed. However, it is
well possible that rejection of the HME is actually due to the empirical failure of the
outside sector assumption rather than the more relevant increasing returns to scale
feature.
Thelinearoutsidesectorhasalsobeenusedinmodelswithheterogeneousﬁrms.4
It may be a perfectly harmless assumption in many applications. However, when one
is interested in aggregate outcomes, such as in welfare, trade policy, or unemploy-
ment, pinning down the wage to a technological constant may have crucial bearings
on the results. Using a two-country asymmetric Melitz model, Felbermayr, Jung and
Larch (2011) argue that outcomes of non-cooperative tariff games depend on using a
linearoutsidesector. Usingasimulatedasymmetricthree-countryMelitzmodelwith
search frictions on the labor market, Felbermayr, Larch and Lechthaler (2009) argue
that the direction cross-country spillovers from labor market reforms also depend on
that assumption. Very recently, Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) use a small
economy Melitz (2003) model to show that eliminating the assumption of an outside
sector reverses the result in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Demidova (2008), where a
country that unilaterally lowers trade costs experiences a decline in welfare.5
Besides its obvious lack of realism, the outside sector assumption may not be in-
nocuous in theoretical work; it is therefore relevant for econometric testing. This
paper shows that the outside sector assumption can be replaced by a Melitz (2003)
type mechanism by which heterogeneous ﬁrms select into exporting according to
their productivity. The country with the larger share in world endowments supports
a more than proportionate share of ﬁrms: a larger fraction of ﬁrms remain purely
domestic and therefore relatively smaller. This allows a larger number of them to ex-
ist in equilibrium, which, in turn, increases welfare per capita in the larger country
due to the availability of a larger range of varieties. The HME arises despite the up-
ward adjustment in wages that the crowding of ﬁrms in the larger country entails.
2In a multi-sector extension of the standard model, Krugman and Venables (1999) show that the
HME continues to exist as long as there are at least some homogeneous goods sectors with zero trans-
portation costs and some differentiated goods sectors with zero ﬁxed costs.
3A number of prominent empirical papers are Feenstra et al., (2001), Head and Ries (2001), Davis
and Weinstein (2003), Hanson and Xiang (2004). In their survey, Head and Mayer (2004) conclude that
“The evidence on HMEs accumulated in those papers is highly mixed”. More recent research ﬁnds
stronger results in favor of the HME; see Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) or Brülhart and Trionfetti (2009).
4Other prominent papers that have used a linear, freely traded, perfectly competitive outside sec-
tor in a Melitz-type environment are Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Grossman, Helpman and
Szeidl (2006), Chor (2009), Baldwin and Okubo (2009), Baldwin and Forslid (2010), and Ossa (2011).
5Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) use this framework to analyze trade policy.
3Higher wages increase the larger country’s market potential. This is particularly rele-
vantfordomesticﬁrmswhosecompetitivecostdisadvantagerelativetoforeignﬁrms
is attenuated by trade costs. Importantly, while the mass of ﬁrms attempting entry is
strictly proportional to the endowment size, the likelihood of a given ﬁrm to success-
fully cover its ﬁxed costs is greater in the larger market.
The HME arises due to the interaction between ﬁxed market access costs and
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in productivity. Fixed export costs alone would not sufﬁce
(Venables, 1994; Medin, 2003). In contrast, the mechanism relies on the fact that
some ﬁrms do not export the share of which is endogenous and positively related to
relative country size. When sorting becomes more pronounced due to larger degree
of productivity dispersion, the HME becomes stronger. As in Helpman and Krug-
man (1985), the HME is magniﬁed by lower trade costs. As in Crozet and Trionfetti
(2008), the HME is non-linear. The result does not require to make assumptions on
the sampling distribution of productivity; it continues to hold even under reverse
sorting of ﬁrms (when exporting ﬁrms are on average less productive than domes-
tic ones). Whether trade frictions turn up as variable or ﬁxed costs does not matter.
Theseresultsapplytowhatwetermaweak (orstatic)HME,i.e.,theoverproprtionate
relationship between the endowment share and the share of ﬁrms. We also charac-
terize a strong (or dynamic) HME, which relates to an overproportionate increase in
the share of ﬁrms triggered by an increase in the endowment share. While the weak
HME holds over all endowment distributions, the strong HME holds only when the
distribution is not too skewed.
Empirically, the literature often states the HME in demand shares: the country
withthelargershareindemandhostsanoverproportionateshareofﬁrms. Withﬁxed
factorprices,thispredictionfollowsfromtherelationshipinendowmentshares. When
factor prices adjust, this is no longer necessary. However, the weak HME continues
to hold when the underlying variation in the demand shares is due to endowment
shocks; if it is due to productivity shocks, the weak HME actually reverses. For em-
pirical work, the single-sector view has the disadvantage, that the share of a country
in the value of production of differentiated goods and its share in demand are identi-
cal due to balanced trade. However, the extension to the empirically relevant multi-
sector situation (as in Behrens et al. (2009) for the homogeneous ﬁrms plus outside
sector model) is not difﬁcult. Then, a (weak) HME exists in the relationship between
the production and the demand shares on the industry level. Nonetheless, our anal-
ysis has important implications for empirical work. HME regressions should account
for the non-linearity of the HME, its dependence on productivity dispersion and the





ables; moreover, their ambition is not to fully characterize endogenous variables in
terms of exogenous ones, but demonstrate the validity of a simple welfare function
that is isomorphic across models with and without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Their
4argument is that heterogeneity and selection matter less for aggregate welfare than
what has been hitherto believed.
In contrast, for our result, heterogeneity is absolutely crucial. We can show that
in the limit, where the model converges to the homogeneous goods Krugman case,
the HME disappears: When a country commands a larger share of world population,
its attractiveness as a production location increases. The increased demand for labor
is accommodated along two margins: ﬁrst, the relative wage of the country goes up;
second, the average size of ﬁrms goes down. In a model with a linear outside sector,
the ﬁrst channel would not be present, and the HME is of maximum size. In a model
with homogeneous ﬁrms, ﬁrm size cannot adjust, and the wage needs to rise until
the number of ﬁrms is exactly proportional to the labor force. The more dispersed
the productivity distribution, the stronger the link between average ﬁrm size and the
number of ﬁrms, and, accordingly, the more pronounced is the HME.
Finally, it is important to notice that the role of the outside sector is crucial for
predictions about trade-induced welfare convergence across countries. In the Melitz
(2003) model with an outside sector, trade liberalization does not entail any conver-
gence: factorpricesareinsensitiveandregionalpricelevelsadjustinexactlythesame
proportions. In the absence of an outside sector, trade liberalization results in con-
vergence of real per capita income like in familiar models of comparative advantage.
This is despite the magniﬁcation of the HME. It is a direct implication of the fact that
the model with the outside sector tends to overstate the HME as wages are paramet-
rically ﬁxed.
Theremainderofthepaperisstructuredasfollows. Chapter2describesthemodel.
Chapter 3 proofs our main results: the existence of the HME, and the magniﬁcation
by lower trade costs or higher productivity dispersion. Chapter 4 contains a discus-
sion of extensions. Chapter 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic environment
The model is the basic extension of Melitz (2003) to the case of two large asymmet-
ric countries, indexed by i 2 fH;Fg. Each country is populated with Li identical
households. Labor is the only factor of production.6 Importantly, each household in-
elastically suppliesone unitof labor.7 We will denotewages by wi. Therepresentative
6We devise the model as a single-factor framework. Multiple (non-traded) factors can be easily
accommodated if one is willing to assume that variable and ﬁxed inputs are in terms of a composite
input, which combines different factor services in a constant returns to scale fashion. That composite
input takes the role of labor in our analysis; all results stated in this paper would continue to hold.
7In the standard Krugman (1980) framework, Fujita et al. (1999) consider a two-sector model with
ﬂexible elasticity of labor supply to the differentiated good sector. With perfectly elastic labor supply,
the HME always appears, but if we approach the perfectly inelastic labor supply case, the HME will be












where the measure of the set 
i is the mass of available varieties, q [z] is the quantity
of variety z consumed, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution.
Firms compete monopolistically in a single sector. After paying ﬁxed setup costs
wife, they obtain information about their productivity level ' which is sampled from
aParetodistributionwhosec.d.f. isgivenbyGi ['] = 1 (bi=')
. Theshapeparameter
 is inversely related to productivity dispersion. In most of this paper we assume
that the location parameter bi is constant across countries.8 Output is linear in '. A
ﬁrm in country i pays ﬁxed market access costs wifij to serve consumers in country
j. Selection implies that a ﬁrm does not necessarily serve both markets. Whenever
advantageous, we use fij = fji = fx and fii = fjj = fd: As usual, exporting involves
symmetric iceberg trade costs ij = ji =   1, where ii = 1. Then, ijwi=' is the
marginal cost of producing one unit of output in i and selling to j. In the following




the minimum productivity level '
ij required for a ﬁrm in country i to make at least











= wifij; i 2 fH;Fg;j 2 fH;Fg; (2)
where  = (  1)= 2 [0;1] is the inverse of the mark-up.9 Since we assume balanced













;i 2 fH;Fg; (3)









is the fraction of ﬁrms located in country i which serve market j: Note that 'e
i de-
reversed for some level of trade costs; see Head and Mayer, 2004, p. 29f.
8Inextensionsweshowthatourcoreresultsholdunderageneralsamplingdistributionofproduc-
tivity. Note that each variety z is produced by a single ﬁrm with productivity level ': We henceforth
index varieties by '.
9The equilibrium conditions are derived in detail in (A.1) in the Appendix.
6notes the productivity of the marginal ﬁrm (the least efﬁcient operative ﬁrm).10  
=(   (   1)) is a strictly positive constant.11 The left hand side of (2) denotes prof-
its of a ﬁrm with labor productivity '
ij: They are proportional to aggregate proﬁts
Rj=: Firm-level proﬁts increase in the foreign price level as the ﬁrm’s competitive
position there is improved; they decrease in wi for the opposite reason. The right
hand side denotes the value of ﬁxed market entry costs.




are equal to entry costs discounted by the probability of successful entry pin
i = 1  
G['e







e;i 2 fH;Fg: (4)
Note that wages have dropped out from this condition.
Finally, there are two labor market clearing conditions. With the above equilib-







i;i 2 fH;Fg: (5)
If pin
i were exogenous (or, as in Krugman (1980) equal to unity), labor supply and the
mass of operative ﬁrms Mi would be proportional and there could not be a HME. It is
the fact that pin
i is endogenous in the model that enables the existence of a HME.
Summarizing, we have four zero cutoff proﬁt conditions (2), two free entry con-
ditions (4) and two labor market clearing conditions (6) to pin down eight unknown





edge of these equilibrium objects allows to determine mij and pin
i : In the following,
we use wF as the numeraire and denote wH=wF  ! as the relative wage.
2.3 Trade balance and equilibrium wage
As the Krugman (1980) model, one can reduce the equilibrium conditions to one
equation in a single unknown, namely !: Balanced trade is implicit in conditions (2),
(4) and (6); it is implied by the representative agents in both countries each satisfying
their respective budget constraints. Nonetheless, it is useful to make the balanced
trade condition explicit. It can be written as
MH rHF = MF rFH; (6)
whereMj rji denotesaggregatesalesofﬁrmslocatedincountryj inmarketi. Onecan
showthat  rij = wimijfij. Usingthedeﬁnitionofmij expressionalongwithequation
10If conventional sorting holds, we have 'e
i = '
ii; if not, we have 'e
i = '
ij: See the discussion below
for further details.
11This is to ensure that the variance of the size distribution is ﬁnite.
7(5), the trade balance condition (6) can be rewritten so that the relative wage ! ap-
pearsasafunctionofHome’sshareintheworldlaborendowment  LH=(LH + LF)























(1   )!= + !
 
1
! ( )= + (1   )

; (8)
where      
fx=fd1 =( 1) 2 (0;1) is a measure of the freeness of trade.
Theﬁrstterminthebracketsof(8)isstrictlydownward-slopingin! from+1;the
second term is strictly upward-sloping from 0. Hence, by (8), a unique equilibrium
relative wage ! exists. If  ! 1 (free trade) or  = 1=2 (symmetric distribution of
laborendowments),! = 1solvesthisequation: wagesareequalizedacrosscountries.
If  < 1 and  > 1=2; one can easily show that ! > 1: the large country has the
higher wage. These ﬁndings are well-known from the Krugman (1980) model which
is nested by equation (8) if  !    1: In that case, the productivity distribution
exhibits maximum dispersion. Only a few very productive ﬁrms exist, and all of them
export. So, the selection channel is effectively shut off and the model collapses to
Krugman’s model of homogeneous ﬁrms.
We summarize this ﬁnding by a ﬁrst lemma.
Lemma 1 The larger country pays the higher wage.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is simple: At given factor costs, ﬁrms ﬁnd it more prof-
itable to produce in the larger market as this minimizes payments of variable trade
and market access costs. To keep labor employed in both countries, this advantage
must be offset by a wage differential.
Empiricalevidencesuggeststhatonlythemostproductiveﬁrmsexport. Themodel
reproduces this stylized fact if parameters are such that '
ij > '
ii: We refer to this
situation as to the case of conventional sorting, whereby pin
i = 1   G['
ii]: Uncon-
ventional sorting obtains if Home becomes very large relative to Foreign, for given
ﬁxed costs, the sorting condition can reverse: then, only the more productive for-
eign ﬁrms serve the small foreign market, so pin





: In line with the evi-
dence, the following analysis assumes that conventional sorting holds. This happens
8in equilibrium, if Home’s share in the world labor endowment is not too big (i.e., if




2.4 Market Crowding and Market Potential Curves
Instead of working with (8), it is insightful to characterize the equilibrium of the
asymmetric Melitz model with the help of two separate equilibrium conditions in
a diagram with pin
H=pin
F   on the y-axis and ! on the x-axis. The two curves have op-
posite slopes and allow conducting comparative statics in an insightful and tractable
manner. Equilibrium of the two-country asymmetric Melitz economy is given by the
intersection of these curves.
Lemma 2 If  <    

;;;fx=fd
; the equilibrium exhibits conventional sort-
ing. There always exists a unique equilibrium at the intersection between a strictly






























 6= 1: (10)
Proof. In the Appendix.
Market crowding condition. Under the assumption of conventional sorting, the
market crowding curve (9) is obtained by combining all four zero cutoff proﬁt condi-
tions (2) and observing that balanced trade implies (7). Without loss of generality, we
focus on the case where Home is large ( > 1=2) and therefore ! > 1: Hence, in the
relevant space (! 2 [1;1)), the curve is strictly downward-sloping. At ! = 1; we have
 = =(1   ):Moreover, convergestozeroas! ! 1:Figure1illustratesthelocus.
We refer to it as the “market crowding curve” (MCC): if ! increases, Home’s relative
labor costs go up and it becomes a less attractive location for production. In turn,
the domestic entry cutoff '
HH relative to '
FF has to go up. So, the likelihood of suc-
cessful entry falls. The MCC illustrates a dispersion force, i.e., a negative equilibrium
correlation between relative costs and locational advantage. It takes an ex post per-
spective in that it summarizes ﬁrm behavior after the resolution of uncertainty about
productivity.




is characterized in (A.3.1) in the Appendix.










Market potential condition. Equation (10) constitutes a second relationship be-
tween relative entry probability  and relative wage !: The derivation starts from the
free entry conditions (4). It makes use of balanced trade (7) and employs equations
(2) to eliminate productivity cutoffs. In the space (! 2 [1;1)), the curve is strictly
upward-sloping. It has an asymptote at ! =  = > 1 and emerges from the point
(1;1)withslope2=((1   )):Figure1illustratesthelocus. Werefertothisschedule
as to the “market potential curve” (MPC): if ! increases, Home’s relative income goes
up so that Home’s market potential increases. This makes entry of ﬁrms more attrac-
tive, the domestic entry cutoff '
HH relative to '
FF has to fall. So, the likelihood of
successful entry goes up. The MPC illustrates an agglomeration force, i.e., a positive
equilibrium correlation between relative market potential and locational advantage.
In contrast to the MCC, the MPC takes an ex ante perspective in that it relates to po-
tential ﬁrms’ decisions to sink setup costs and learn about their productivities. The
MPC is convex if  > =(4 + ); a sufﬁcient condition for this is  > 1=5:13
Figure 1 contains the same information as equation (8). In particular, it is easy
to see that  > 1=2 implies ! > 1: At ! = 1, the ex ante proﬁtability curve implies a
relative entry probability equal to unity, while the ex post proﬁtability curve implies
a relative entry probability equal to =(1   ). Assume without loss of generality  >
1=2. Then, =(1   ) > 1. Given the shape of the curves, wage equalization is an
equilibrium only with  = 1=2. When the strict inequality holds, we have ! > 1.
13With the realistic parameterization  = 0:74 (i.e.  = 3:8); and  = 3:3; convexity requires that
 > 0:053: That, in turn, requires an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 144 percent if fx=fd = 1; and even
higher if fx > fd:
103 Single-Sector Home Market Effects
3.1 Preliminaries
We are interested in the mapping between the share of ﬁrms located in the larger
economy and its share in the world labor endowment. From equation (5) we know
that the mass of active ﬁrms in each country is proportional to the labor force times
the probability of successful entry.14 This allows writing Home’s share of ﬁrms as a








1 + (   1)
: (12)
Clearly,  increases in  and falls in :
Beforeweproceed, weneedamoreprecisedeﬁnitionofthephenomenonthatwe
are interested in:
Deﬁnition1 A weak(static)homemarketeffect (weak HME) exists, if the share of
ﬁrms located in Home is larger than its share in the world labor endowment, i.e., if
 > :
A strong (dynamic) home market effect (strong HME) exists, if an increase in Home’s
labor share yields a more than proportionate increase in Home’s share of ﬁrms, i.e., if

0 () > 1:
The weak form of the HME is the one usually discussed in the literature. The def-
inition of the HME used by Helpman and Krugman (1985), Hanson and Xiang (2004)
or Behrens et al. (2009) coincide with it. In the standard case with a linear outside
sector (with or without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity),15  is equal to a constant   and so
 =  :TheweakHMEmaterializesifandonlyif   > 1:Linearityofinimpliesthat
the requirement for the strong HME is identical: 
0 () =   > 1: Hence, in contrast to
the single-sector model, in the presence of a linear outside sector, it is not interesting
to distinguish a weak and a strong version of the HME.





15See Appendix C for the model with a linear outside sector.
113.2 Home Market Effects
Using Figure 1, it is very easy to show that the model exhibits a weak HME. Remem-
bering  > 1=2; equation (12) and Deﬁnition 1 imply that
 > 1 ,  > 1: (13)
So, a weak HME exists if and only if the probability of successful entry,  is greater in
the larger home economy than in Foreign, i.e., pin
H=pin
F   > 1: Figure 1 establishes
that this is indeed the case since =(1   ) > 1 so that all admissible realizations
of  satisfy (13) and there is indeed a weak HME. Note the crucial role of ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity: if all ﬁrms were identical, and thus, in a meaningful equilibrium,16
all of them would ﬁnd it worthwhile to produce, in both countries we would have
pin
i = 1; and hence  = 1: It follows that  = 1 and the relationship between  and 
would be one-to-one: there would not be a HME.
ThestrongHME isslightlymoreinvolved. Itobtainswhenanincreaseinthelabor
share of a country leads to a more-than-proportionate increase in its share of ﬁrms.
Denote by x the elasticity of some variable x with respect to : Then,
 = 1 +  > 1 ,  > 0 (14)
To verify the validity of the above condition, one needs to understand how ; and
hence ; depend on : This can be easily seen with the help of our ﬁgure, where the
effect of an increase in Home’s share of labor affects only the market crowding curve.
It shifts upwards if  increases; the shift is larger, the smaller  is initially. Figure 2
illustrates this situation. Clearly, an increase in  leads to a higher relative wage !
and to a higher relative entry probability of Home.
So, as long as the conventional sorting condition holds, d=d > 0 and d2=d
2 <
0: Using (12), it is clear that around the symmetric equilibrium ( = 1=2; = 1); the
derivative of  with respect to  is given by (d=d)=2: It follows that, around the
symmetric equilibrium,  > 0 is positive and a strong HME exists. As  grows away
from symmetry, the positive increments to  become smaller; moreover, a higher 
also has a direct negative effect on : It follows that  > 0 cannot hold for all : Let
  denote the endowment share at which conventional sorting does no longer hold.
It can be proved that the strong HME exists over an interval (1=2;
) with the critical
value 
 bounded by 
 <  :
We know from equation (12), that a change in the relative entry probability 
translates into a change in the share of ﬁrms . So, a shock on  has both a “price
effect” and a “quantity effect” (Head and Mayer, 2004). The higher relative wage of
Home shifts the price distribution since it affects unit labor costs. It also affects the
composition of productivities and the share of ﬁrms that do not ﬁnd it worthwhile
to operate (besides the obvious effect of increasing the number of ﬁrms that attempt

















entry.) In the one-sector Krugman (1980) model, only the price effect emerges. Re-
sourcesareﬁxedbyfull-employmentandbalancedtradeconditions, wherethelatter
ensures that the larger country pays the higher wage. Note that the equilibrium rela-
tive entry probability  is concave in relative size . The reason is that (i) the market
potential curve is concave in the relative wage, (ii) it is not shifted itself by a country
size shock, and (iii) the relative wage is strictly increasing in the share of consumers.
These considerations allow stating the ﬁrst main result of the paper:
Proposition 1 (Homemarketeffect). Withoutlossofgenerality, assume > 1=2:Also,
assume that conventional sorting holds ( <  ). Then,
(a) the model exhibits a weak HME if Home’s endowment share lies in the interval
(1=2;  );
(b) and a strong HME if Home’s endowment share lies in the interval (1=2;
); where

   :
Proof. In the Appendix.
In the asymmetric Melitz (2003) model, the larger country pays the higher wage.
However, with heterogeneous ﬁrms, a deviation from wage equalization also induces
selection effects which imply that the larger country hosts an overproportional share
of ﬁrms. This effect is related to the “quantity effect” discussed in Head and Mayer
(2004). It is still more proﬁtable to produce in the larger market to minimize variable
trade and market access costs. However, in the Melitz environment, presence in the
large country is particularly valuable for ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels.
Since they do not export, the higher wage in Home puts them at a competitive disad-
vantage in Home but not in Foreign. The adjustment of entry margins in the Melitz
13Figure 3: Home Market Effects with and without an outside sector  
𝜙 
𝜆 
𝜆∗  (.5,.5) 
(1,1)  𝜙 
𝜆  (.5,.5) 
(1,1) 
𝜆   𝜆∗ 
Helpman-Krugman (1985) or Melitz (2003) 




not crowd out the quantity effect as it would without ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Proposition 1 applies also when  < 1=2; where Foreign would exhibit a weak
HMEovertheinterval
 




Proposition 1 can be strengthened in so far as the weak HME can be shown to extend
into the region of unconventional sorting; see the extension in section 4.1. Figure
3 anticipates this generalization and graphically illustrates the strong and the weak
HMEs in models with and without a linear outside sector. The diagram on the left
hand is the standard illustration of the HME in the Helpman-Krugman (1985) world.
It also holds in the Melitz (2003) model with a linear outside sector.17 In the interval
 < 
; there is a strong HME as the share of ﬁrms increases more than proportion-
ately due to an increase in : When  > 
; the large economy is fully agglomerated
( = 1); so that the strong HME cannot hold anymore. Clearly, a weak HME exists
over the entire interval. The diagram on the right-side illustrates the HMEs in the
single-sector Melitz case. The functional relationship () clearly is increasing from
(1/2,1/2) to (1,1). It has a kink at  =  ; where conventional sorting no longer holds
anymore. So, over the interval  < 
 the strong HME holds, while the weak HME ob-
tains over the full interval. Moreover, () can be shown to be concave in the interval
(1=2;  ) but is convex in the interval ( ;1):
Finally, one can show that the existence of a linear outside sector in the Melitz
(2003) model magniﬁes the HME relative to the case where the outside sector is ab-
sent. In particular, in the case with the outside sector, the slope of the locus () is
equal to 1 + 2. In the single-sector case, it is equal to 1 + =(2   (1   )=); see
17See Appendix C for the model with a linear outside sector.










(A.5) in the Appendix for details. That the linear outside sector exaggerates the HME
follows from the fact that 1    < =:
3.3 Home Market Magniﬁcation Effects
Next, we investigate how the strength of the HME is affected by the freeness of trade
and by the extent of productivity dispersion. In the traditional Helpman-Krugman
casewithoutsidesector,lowervariabletradecostsmaketheHMEmorepronounced.
Theyalsomakeitmorelikelythatthemodeldegeneratestofullagglomeration(where
Home has all ﬁrms). This home market magniﬁcation effect also exists in our case;
only it appears in a somewhat subtler form due to the absence of a linear outside
sector. We also show that increased dispersion of productivity magniﬁes the HME.
The role of freeness of trade. Remember that freeness of trade is deﬁned as
     
fx=fd1 =( 1) : It falls when variable trade costs  shrink and/or when for-
eign entry costs relative to domestic ones fx=fd fall. The precise origin of a change in
 does not matter for the result. Conveniently,  only appears in the market potential
curve but not in the market crowding curve. Using Figure 1, the comparative statics
with respect to  are therefore very easy. Figure 4 provides an illustration.
The intuition is that for a given wage (market potential), a higher freeness of trade
favors the larger country since serving the smaller country through exports is now
cheaper. The market crowding locus is not affected since freeness of trade rises sym-
metrically. Hence, the equilibrium relative entry probability goes up, which trans-
lates into a larger HME since  rises in  for given . Moreover, the equilibrium rela-
tive wage declines, so that higher freeness of trade leads to convergence of nominal
15Figure 5: Home market magniﬁcation due to higher freeness of trade  
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There are additional side effects. Higher  makes it more likely that the conven-
tional sorting conditions fails to hold, so   falls and the kink in the () locus oc-
curs earlier. Moreover, also the interval over which the strong HME can be observed
shrinkssince
 fallsaswell. Figure5providesanillustrationin(;) space. Aslong
as conventional sorting continues to hold, one can show that  increases so that the
HME becomes stronger.18 As a corollary, there must be some interval over which also
the strong HME becomes augmented.
Theroleofproductivitydispersion. Next,weconsiderthecomparativestaticswith
respectto;theshapeparameteroftheParetodistribution,whichisinverselyrelated
to the variance of the sampling distribution.  appears in both the market crowding
and the market potential curves. An increase in  rotates both down. This leads to
an unambiguously negative effect on relative entry probabilities ; while the effect
on the wage rate depends on model parameters in a complicated fashion. Lower
 translates into lower  so that the (weak) HME is diminished when  goes up (i.e.,
whenthedispersionofproductivityfalls). Theconverseistrue,too: higherdispersion
magniﬁesthe(weak)HME.Theintuitionforthisresultisthatdifferencesindomestic
entry cutoffs due to size differentials are magniﬁed when the productivity dispersion
is higher. In other words, selection is more important. It turns out to favor the larger
country ex ante and ex post. So, for the emergence of a HME in the single-sector
Melitz model, productivity dispersion is important.19
18We provide a generalization of this result to the case of unconventional sorting in the extensions
below.
19This ﬁnding has important implications for empirical studies on the HME, such as Hanson and
Xiang (2004). The model suggests that one important industry characteristic that shapes the size of










The following proposition summarizes this second key result of our analysis.
Proposition 2 (HomeMarketMagniﬁcationEffects). Assumethatconventionalsort-
ing holds ( <  ). Then the (weak) home market effect is magniﬁed by
(a) a higher freeness of trade and
(b) a higher degree of productivity dispersion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.4 Distribution of Endowments, Distribution of Real Income, and
Trade
In this subsection we show that the distribution of labor endowments across coun-
tries matters for the distribution of per capita real income (welfare). We also investi-
gate how cross-country income inequality is affected by trade liberalization. Impor-
tantly, the single-sector predicts convergence in real income levels while the model
with a linear-outside sector does not.
Analytical results. To study real per capita income, one can exploit a well known
feature of the Melitz (2003) model, where a country’s real income per worker (welfare
per worker) is proportional to its domestic entry cutoff. This directly follows from the
the HME is the degree of productivity dispersion as captured by the shape parameter of the Pareto
distribution.













This, in turn, allows to write relative real per capita income (the cross-country gap in
living standards) as a function of a single endogenous variable that has played a key












WeknowfromFigure1,that < =(1   ):Togetherwiththecondition >  1;this
ensures that WH > WF: So, the larger Home has the higher real per capita income.20
For the same reason, it is easy to see that WH=WF increases with  so that a more
unequal distribution of the world labor endowment leads to more disparity in terms
of welfare per capita.
Equation (16) is also useful to understand the fundamental drivers of interna-
tional disparities. For given relative country size, an increase in the freeness of trade
raises  and therefore lowers WH=WF: In other words, trade liberalization leads to
convergence of real income per capita across countries. The intuition is that higher
freeness of trade favors the more open country, which is the small country. In the
model, convergence of real income is equivalent to factor price convergence.
Importantly, trade liberalization does not lead to convergence if the model fea-











where  2 (0;1) is the share of expenditure that the representative consumer allo-
cates to the differentiated good. Clearly, there is no role for trade openness in that
expression of the real income gap. The intuition for this result lies in the simple fact
that ﬁxing the wage rate also ﬁxes mill prices in a CES environment. So, trade liber-
alization could affect W differently across countries, if cutoff productivity levels were
differently affected by a change in : This is, however, not possible when wages are
insensitive to  and :
We have argued above that the presence of a linear outside sector exaggerates the
importance of the HME. Interestingly, one can show that this does not imply that
the cross-country welfare differential must be bigger, too. Quite the opposite is true.
Comparison of (16) and (17) reveals that the welfare differential is larger in the ab-
sence of the outside sector if  < [=(1   )]
(1 )=( 1) : This inequality always holds
if  > 1=2 : Figure 1 implies  < =(1   ) and  (1   )=(   1) > 0: We summarize
these results in the following proposition:
20This result extends to the case of unconventional sorting; see (A.7.3) in the Appendix.
21See Appendix C for a detailed description of this model.
18Proposition 3 (Percapitaincomeandconvergence). Assume that conventional sort-
ing holds ( <  ).
(a) The larger economy exhibits the higher real per capita income.
(b) Trade liberalization leads to real per capita income convergence across countries.
There is no convergence in the presence of a linear outside sector.
(c) The presence of linear outside sector reduces cross-country real income disparities.
Proof. In the text.
Numerical analysis. Finally, we are interested in the role of ﬁrm-level productivity
dispersion for cross-country welfare differences. However, the effect of a higher de-
gree of productivity dispersion (lower ) on relative welfare is ambiguous. Lower 
raises , which reduces relative welfare. At the same time, the elasticity of relative
welfare in  falls (in absolute terms), which works in the opposite direction. For this
reason, and to gain a rough idea of how important the quantitative importance of
endowment differences is for the cross-country welfare gap, we carry out a simple
numerical analysis. The calibration of the model is very standard and follows the
literature; see Bernard et al. (2007) for a leading example.
We highlight the role of ﬁrm-level productivity dispersion for relative real income
differencesacrosscountriesbycomparingtheMelitz(2003)modelwithaParetosam-
pling distribution to Krugman (1980). In the calibration, we make sure that the two
scenarios yield the same relative welfare for some common : From Arkolakis et al.
(2011), we know that this requires that, across the two models, at some ; the en-
dogenous degree of ‘autarkiness’ and the used trade elasticities are identical. For the
calibration we choose  = 1=2; and then simulate WH=WF for  > 1=2: Details of the
calibration are explained in Appendix B.
Figure7displaysWH=WF fortheMelitz(solidline)andtheKrugman(dashedline)
models.22 Clearly, in both models cross-country welfare differences increase as the
distribution of labor endowment becomes more unequal. However, the increase is
stronger in the world with productivity dispersion. Figure 7 shows that in both mod-
els, a deviation from symmetry to, say,  = 0:6 leads to a fairly substantial increase in
international inequality: Home’s welfare is now about 10% larger than Foreign’s. So,




see Figure 8 in both the Melitz and the Krugman models. However, the amount of
convergence is larger in the Krugman case. Thus, ﬁrm-level heterogeneity lowers the
convergence gains that an increase in  delivers.23
22We only consider cases in which conventional sorting holds under the Melitz speciﬁcation.
23Note that the range in which conventional sorting holds shrinks in response to trade liberaliza-
tion.
19Figure 7: Welfare differential and endowment distribution













Solid line: Benchmark speciﬁcation. Dashed line: Krugman speciﬁcation.
Figure 8: Welfare differential and trade liberalization













Solid line: Benchmark speciﬁcation. Dashed line: Krugman speciﬁcation. Blue line: Before liberalization. Red line: After liberalization
The following observation provides a summary.
Observation1 Firm-levelproductivityheterogeneityexacerbatescross-countryreal
per capita income differences and reduces the amount of real per capita income con-
vergence brought about by trade liberalization.
4 Extensions and Additional Results
4.1 Unconventional Sorting
It is a well documented stylized fact that only the most productive ﬁrms engage in
exporting; see Bernard et al. (2007). We have this situation “conventional sorting”
and have so far assumed that it holds. In symmetric equilibrium, fx > fd is a sufﬁ-
20cient condition to guarantee this sorting pattern.24 Then, only the most productive
ﬁrms will generate sufﬁciently large sales to overcome export ﬁxed costs. However,
when countries are asymmetric in size, the sorting pattern can reverse in the smaller
country. The intuition for this lies in the fact that less productive ﬁrms would make
negative proﬁts on their small domestic market, for which ﬁxed costs are high rela-
tive to revenue, while they can make proﬁts on the large export market, where ﬁxed
costs are lower relative to revenue. When the sorting pattern reverses, the deﬁnition
of the relative entry probability  needs to be adapted since pin
F will now be given by
1   G['
FH].
The balanced trade condition (8) is not affected by the reversal of the sorting con-
dition. So, it is still true that the larger country commands the higher wage. Also
equations(11)and(12)continuetohold. However,themarketcrowdingcurve (MCC)








It follows from the relative zero cutoff proﬁt conditions for targeting the Home’s mar-
ket. Clearly,theMCCisstrictlydecreasingin!:Incontrasttothecaseofconventional
sorting, it is now independent of  but depends on trade costs. The market potential






 (!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: (19)
The MPC is strictly increasing in !, and now depends on  as long as on trade costs.
Similar to the case of conventional sorting, equilibrium can be determined by the
intersection of the modiﬁed MPC and MCC curves. Evaluated at ! = 1, the MPC
curve yields  > 1. Hence, the weak HME also occurs under unconventional sorting.
Variable trade cost liberalization; in turn, shifts both the MCC and MPC down.
Lowering relative export ﬁxed costs additionally moves both curves proportionally.
Hence, a higher freeness of trade lowers the relative probability, which dampens the
home market effect. Higher  also lowers the HME. This is a necessary consequence
of the fact that (1) = 1: We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Unconventional sorting). Assume that unconventional sorting holds
( >  ).
(a) The larger country has a higher relative wage (!) and higher relative participation
probability (), so that a weak home market effect exists.
(b) Higher freeness of trade () or higher asymmetries in country size () reduce , so
that the (weak) home market effect is diminished.
As a corollary, the model features a weak HME over all possible cross-country al-
locationsoftheworldlaborendowment. AsinCrozetandTrionfetti(2008)the(weak)
HME is non-linear. Their numerical exercise suggests that the HME is concave in 
24In the presence of variable trade costs, this requirement can be weakened.
21forvaluesofaroundthesymmetricequilibriumandconvexthereafter. Inoursetup,
the HME is concave for  <   and convex for  >  :
4.2 Technology differences and the HME in demand shares
Empirical work typically employs cross-industry data to study how shocks on de-
mand shares affect production patterns. We do not pursue the straight-forward ex-
tension of our model to the multi-industry case, but characterize analytically the en-
dogenous relationship between Home’s share of ﬁrms () and its share in world de-
mand ().25 Home’s share in world demand (GDP) is given by
  (1 + (1   )=(!))
 1 ;
which is of course endogenous to the model. In the standard setup, with an identi-
cally parameterized linear outside sector in both countries, we would have ! = 1 and
therefore  = : The HME in demand shares is then identical to the HME in endow-
ment shares. In our case, this is of course different since ! > 1: The relative wage
can be affected through exogenous changes in  and/or through differences in the
technology levels across countries. We model the latter by differences in the lower
bound of the productivity distribution, which we again take to be the Pareto. I.e, we
ﬁx the shape parameter of the Pareto () in both countries, but assume that there are
cross-country differences in the minimum admissibly productivity level (bi):
We deﬁne the (weak) home market effect in demand shares as an overpropor-
tional relationship between the share of ﬁrms and the demand share, so that  >
1=2 )  > : From equation (11), it is easy to see that the HME in demand shares
requires  > !. Note that the condition for a HME in demand shares is stronger than
the one for a HME in labor shares, which is  > 1.
Let B  (bH=bF)
 denote the degree of productivity differences. Then, the relative
entry probability is deﬁned as   B ('
FF='
HH)
 : We show in the Appendix that the




























range, the denominator is always positive. The sign of the numerator is unclear as
B > 1; < 1;! > 1.
25Toworkwiththeshareofproductionratherthantheshareofﬁrmswouldrequireamulti-industry
setup. In the single-sector framework that approach would lead to an identity (GDP = GDP).
22First, consider labor share asymmetries under symmetric productivities, i.e., B =
1. While the generalized MCC and MPC curves collapse to the ones in section (2),
a weak HME in demand shares requires that  > ! so that an parameter restriction
is necessary. One can show that a weak HME arises if and only if  > =(2 + );
a sufﬁcient condition for this is  > 1=3:26 Next, consider a symmetric distribution
of the world labor endowment, but differences in the loci of the Pareto productiv-
ity distributions across countries. Then, the necessary condition for a weak HME
can never hold. Hence, there exists a weak reverse HME: the richer country hosts an
underproportional share of ﬁrms. This is due to the fact that higher average produc-
tivity translates into larger average ﬁrm size so that the number of ﬁrms has to adjust
downwards. Productivity growth (as modeled by an increase in bH) therefore leads to
lowerprices, butalsoreducesthenumberofdomesticallyproducedvarietiesthatare
available without trade costs.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Home market effect in demand shares).Let  be Home’s share in GDP .
Assumethatconventionalsortingholds
 
 <  

andthatthefreenessoftradeisnottoo
low ( > 1=3).
(a) Let  > 1=2 and B = 1. Then, the larger economy exhibits a weak HME in demand
shares ( > ).
(b) Let  = 1=2 and B > 1: Then, the richer economy exhibits a weak reverse HME in
demand shares ( < ).
Proof. In the Appendix.
Ifboth > 1=2andB > 1;thesituationismorecomplicated. AweakHMEobtains
if the relative endowment of Home (LH=LF) is large enough relative to B: The ﬁnding
that the underlying cause for cross-country variation in demand shares matters for
whether or not a HME exists, is important for empirical work. If a researcher runs a
regression of  on ; it is important to control for some measure of b; for example av-
erage TFP. Failing to do so may explain why the empirical literature has found mixed
support for the (weak) HME so far.
4.3 The HME with a General Sampling Distribution
In this subsection, we generalize the argument to a situation where ﬁrms’ productiv-
ity levels are sampled from a general productivity distribution. Our MCC and MPC
curves hinge on the assumption of the Pareto distribution and are therefore of no
help in the general case. While it is difﬁcult to derive results on the strong HME or on
magniﬁcation effects, it is possible to establish the weak HME for the case of conven-
tional sorting.
26With the simple (and very standard) calibration of section 3.4, the requirement for the weak HME
is  > 0:1: This would represent an valorem tariff equivalent of 95 per cent ( = 1:946): Hence, the
condition is likely to be met in all reasonable circumstances.
23To this end, it appears useful to reduce the equilibrium conditions (2) - (6) to two
equations in ! and Home’s export cutoff '
HF; which have opposite slopes. The two
loci are substantially more complicated than our MCC and MPC schedules, but they
are still useful for our purposes. Labor endowment shares affect only one of these
curves, which allows inference on the effect of a country size shock on the relative
wageandthevariouscutoffs. Moreover, drawingonageneralizedlabormarketclear-
ing condition, we can derive our result on the home market effect. We relegate the
formal proofs to the Appendix and immediately summarize the results:
Lemma 1’ Assume that productivity levels are sampled from a general productivity
distribution. Then, the larger country pays the higher wage.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 2(a)’ Assumethatproductivitylevelsaresampledfromageneralproduc-
tivity distribution. Moreover, assume that conventional sorting holds. Then, the econ-





Proof. In the Appendix.
4.4 Margins of Trade and the HME
The conventional Helpman-Krugman model has the important prediction that the
larger country should be a net exporter of the differentiated good and a net importer
of the outside good. This prediction is less suited than the HME to empirically dis-
criminatemodelswithincreasingreturnstoscaleattheﬁrmlevelfrommodelsbased
oncomparativeadvantage,sincethelattermodelscangiverisetosimilarpredictions
(Helpman, 1999; Hanson and Xiang, 2004). From a theory perspective, the trade pat-
ternresultisadirectcorollaryoftheHMEiftheuppertierdemandstructureishomo-
thetic: An increase in Home’s labor force triggers an overproportional expansion of
thedifferentiatedgoodssector; thisrequiresthatthelaborshareofthehomogeneous
goods sector shrinks; expenditure shares, in contrast, remain constant.
In our simple single-sector model, one cannot discuss the sectoral trade pattern.
However, it is easy to see that an asymmetric distribution of the world labor endow-
ment has implications for the margins of trade. The balanced trade condition (6) can















Remember that  rij = mijwifij is the value of sales on market j that a ﬁrm located
on market i can expect ex ante. We can decompose relative exports into its extensive
and the intensive margin. Since the larger country has the higher wage, that is ! > 1;
24the second equality implies mHFMH < mFHMF: So, there are fewer exporters in H
than in F: Given that the mass of ﬁrms active in Home is larger than the mass of ﬁrms
in Foreign, i.e. MH > MF, it must be case that the larger country exhibits the lower
export participation rate. However, Home’s exporters are larger on average. We state
this testable implication of the model as a corollary to Lemma 1:27
Corollary 1 Exports of the larger country are dominated by the intensive margin; ex-




so without imposing a linear, perfectly competitive and frictionless outside sector, as
the literature has usually chosen to do. The outside sector assumption has been crit-
icized to be unrealistic and possibly important for aggregate results, such as welfare
(Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare, 2011), or for the ability of the model to predict a
Home Market Effect (HME), by which a large country attracts a more than propor-
tionate share of producing ﬁrms (Davis, 1998).
The present analysis focuses on the HME, which has been used as a criterion to
discriminate between trade models featuring increasing returns to scale and more
conventional comparative advantage based setups. It shows that the unrealistic and
potentially problematic outside sector assumption can be replaced by a Melitz-type
selection mechanism, where only a fraction of heterogeneous ﬁrms sell to all mar-
kets. The resulting HME is non-linear, as the empirical analysis of Crozet and Tri-
onfetti (2008) suggests. It is magniﬁed by falling trade costs and by a higher degree
of ﬁrm-level productivity dispersion. The HME translates into cross-country welfare
differences. In contrast to the model with a linear outside sector, trade liberaliza-
tion attenuates these cross-country differences and leads to real wage convergence.
Firm-levelheterogeneityisabsolutelycrucialfortheseresults: intheKrugman(1980)
single-sector model, no HME can arise.
The results presented in this paper are important for empirical work. First, since
the outside-sector is not crucial for the existence of a HME, an empirical rejection
of an overproportionate relation between a country’s share of ﬁrms and its share of
endowments is indeed evidence against increasing returns and not against the linear
outside sector. Second, empirical tests that fail to control for the level of technology
may wrongly reject the existence of an endowment-driven HME.
27Interestingly, the opposite result follows if one assumes that ﬁxed market entry costs are in terms
of foreign instead of domestic labor. The corollary could therefore be used to discriminate empirically
between the approaches. Clearly, any empirical test would have to acknowledge that countries also
differ with respect to the ex ante production distribution.
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28A ProofsofLemmasandPropositions,DetailstoDeriva-
tions
A.1 Derivation of equilibrium conditions
Zero cutoff proﬁt conditions. Demand for any variety is given by










1  dz and Ri denotes aggre-
gate expenditure.28 Given the demand function, the price charged at the factory gate
is wi=('). Then, operating proﬁts of a ﬁrm from country i on market j are

























































where   =(    + 1) is a positive constant.
Free entry condition. Using optimal demand and the zero cutoff proﬁt condition,























































28Note that each variety z is produced by a single ﬁrm with productivity level ': We henceforth
index varieties by '.
29which reduces to the expression in the text.
























where the second equality follows from inserting Me
i = Mi=pin
i , using the free entry
conditiontosubstituteoutfe;andusingthezerocutoffproﬁtconditionstosubstitute
out the cutoff productivity levels. The formula in the text follows from using the free
entry condition to substitute out
P
j mijfij and noting that =(   1) = =.
Tradebalancecondition. Inanalogytoexpectedproﬁts,wecanwriteexpectedrev-










Using this expression, the labor market clearing condition, the deﬁnition of mij and
exploiting symmetry of ﬁxed cost, we obtain the balanced trade condition (7).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1






Using the budget constraint wiLi =
P
























Relative zero cutoff proﬁt conditions can be used to substitute out productivity cut-
offs. Then,the balanced trade condition
HF (1   ) = FH
implies
!







! (! =   )
30If  > 1=2; we have
!
=   !
1 = >  (1   !):
This equation is violated for !  1 since = > 1 so that the left hand side would be
negative while the right hand side would be positive. It follows that  > 1=2 must
entail ! > 1:
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
A.3.1 Derivation of conventional sorting cutoff  
Cutoff level   up to which Foreign ﬁrst serves domestic and then export market is




















Market potential and market crowding curves imply
 
1    
=
    !=
 !=   1
 !
( )=; (24)
which is equivalent to equation (8).Using this expression to substitute out
 
1   from



































This expression can be used to back out   from equation (24).
A.3.2 Derivation of market crowding curve
In order to derive the market crowding curve (MCC), we use the zero cutoff proﬁt
conditions in relative terms and the balanced trade condition. Taking F as the target































where   ('
FF='
HH)
 denotes Home’s relative entry probability.
A.3.3 Derivation of market potential curve
Inordertoderivethemarketpotentialcurve(MPC),weusethefreeentryconditions
in relative form along with the zero cutoff proﬁt conditions and the balanced trade
condition.



















Using the zero cutoff proﬁt conditions and the trade balance condition to eliminate





























































































32A.3.4 Characteristics of market potential and market crowding curve
Market crowding curve. The market crowding curve implies a downward-sloping






Evaluated at ! = 1, the market crowding curve takes the value  = 
1   1.  is
bounded from below by 0.
Marketpotentialcurve. Evaluatedat! = 1;wehave = 1. Giventhatisrestricted
to positive values, we have ! < 
 

. The market potential curve implies an upward-
























































The sign of the second derivative is the sign of









+ 2 + (   )!

:
Evaluating in symmetric equilibrium (! =  = 1), we obtain




Moreover, it is easy to check that h[!] is strictly increasing in !. The reason is that 
is increasing in !. Moreover,  > :
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
A.4.1 Weak HME
In symmetric equilibrium ( = 1=2), we have  = ! =  = 1. In response to a labor
















[1 + (   1)]
2  0;
where the equality occurs for  = 1. Hence, for  > 1=2; we have  > 1, which is the
deﬁnition of the weak HME.
A.4.2 Strong HME
Remember that
 = ; =





























1 + (   1)
1








































The conjecture is that we can identify a downward- and an upward-sloping curve






























We prove that the left hand side is downward-sloping in ! and therefore downward-

































































































































=@! < 0: To check
this, deﬁne





























We have to show that
f
0 [!]g [!]   f [!]g
0 [!] < 0;
where
f














































































































































Since 1   !
 

 < 1 and !
 
2

































































































































































































 1 rises in ; given













locus determine a unique 
 such that for  < 
 a strong HME occurs.
A.5 Slope of () in symmetric equilibrium
Preliminaries. It is easy to check that @=@ =  + @=@; where the ﬁrst term is
the direct effect of a country size shock on . The second term represents the indirect





















































Homemarketeffect. At symmetric equilibrium, the slope of the -curve is given by
@
@







which is strictly smaller than the slope of  in  for the case with the outside sector,
which is equal to 1 + 2 (see Appendix C) since (1   )= < 1:
























: In contrast, the
model with an outside sector implies @2=@@ = 2:
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
A.6.1 Freeness of trade
Evaluated at ! = 1, the market potential curve takes the value  = 1, which does not
depend on . The market potential curve rotates upwards in response to a freeness















The locus of the market crowding curve is unaffected. Then,  has to increase, which
raises  and therefore magniﬁes the HME. This proves part (a) of proposition (2). The
equilibrium value of ! declines in response to a freeness of trade shock.
A.6.2 Productivity dispersion
Evaluated at ! = 1, the market crowding curve yields  = =(1   ); which does not









 ln[!] < 0
since ! > 1.
Evaluated at ! = 1, the market potential curve yields  = 1, which does not de-






























where the indirect effect through adjustment in the relative wage is non-negative
since !

    > 0; !
 

    > 0, and !  1. The direct effect through changes in














as   1 and fx=fd > 1.




















































+ (   1)ln[]

;
Note that the expression on the left hand side and on the right hand side intersect at
! = 1. We conjecture that for ! > 1, the expression on the right hand side rises faster
than the expression on the left hand side. Let



























































+ (   1)ln[]

:
The slope of the left hand side is given by
f









































































































Rearranging terms, we get
 2 <









































 + ( + 1)
   2





















 ln[] >  2;
where the inequality holds since we have only positive terms on the left hand side
(remember that  > 1 and  >    1) and a negative term on the right side.
Hence,  rises in response to an drop in  (higher dispersion), which raises  and
magniﬁes the HME. This proves part (b) of proposition 2.
39A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
A.7.1 Weak HME
Under unconventional sorting, the trade balance condition (8) remains unaffected.
Hence, the positive relationship between the labor share and the relative wage con-
tinues to hold.
































which constitutes our market crowding curve.





 !=   
1   !=:
We use equation (29) to substitute out !

 in the denominator and solve for , which








 (!=   )
The market potential curve is strictly increasing in !.












Together with equation (12), this proves the existence of a (weak) HME under uncon-
ventional sorting.
A.7.2 Home Market Magniﬁcation Effect
Lower variable trade cost shift the down both the market crowding and the market
potential curves. Lower export ﬁxed cost additionally shift both curves proportion-
ally. Hence, a higher freeness of trade lowers the relative entry probability under un-
conventional sorting, which implies that the home market effect is dampened under
unconventional sorting.
40A.7.3 Welfare differential












This is a general expression which holds under conventional and unconventional
sorting. ! is increasing in  also under unconventional sorting. The inequality fol-
lows from  > 1=2, ! > 1,  > (   1); and 2 > . While under conventional sorting
an increase in the freeness of trade reduces ! and therefore the welfare differential,
it is unclear whether trade liberalization leads to real per capita income convergence
under unconventional sorting because the effect on ! is ambiguous.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We ﬁrst augment the model by differences in the lower bound of the productivity
distribution bi. This leaves the zero cutoff proﬁt conditions unchanged, but affects
various equations of the model. The relative entry probability is given by
 
1   GH ['
HH]










where B  (bH=bF)


















































where the bi disappeared because it is part of :





























The market crowding curve is downward sloping in !: Evaluated at ! = 1, we have
 = B2 






































 (1   ) > 0:













). In the supported range, the denominator is always
positive. The sign of the numerator is unclear as B > 1; < 1;! > 1.






































A weak HME in demand shares occurs if  > !.
A necessary condition for  > ! is that the value of the market potential curve




 for  = !; which is given by





















[~ !] > ~ ! , [~ !] = B













































where `  =(1   ) with `  1.
In the presence of symmetric country sizes, i.e. `; the necessary condition for a
weak HME in demand shares reduces to
 > 1:
This condition can never hold. To the contrary, we always have  < 1. Hence, if
countries differ only in the lower productivity bound, the richer country hosts an
underproportional share of ﬁrms. This proves part (b) of our proposition.
WenowprovethattheweakHMEindemandsharesarisesunderamildcondition











If ` increases, the numerator increases, but the denominator increases faster, such
that the term on the right hand side declines. Then, a sufﬁcient condition for a weak






































A.9 Proof of Lemma 1’
As proposed by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011), we reduce the model’s equi-
libriumconditions(2), (4)and(6)toasystemoftwoequationsin! and'
HF, Theﬁrst
curve draws on zero cutoff proﬁt and free entry conditions and is independent of the















Foreign’s domestic entry cutoff '
FF is a function of its export cutoff '
FH by free entry.
Moreover, using the relative cutoff proﬁt conditions for entry into Home, '
FH can
be expressed as a function of the relative ! and '
HH. The latter is a function of '
HF
by free entry. Hence, our ﬁrst equilibrium condition constitutes an upward sloping
43and concave relationship between the relative wage and Home’s export cutoff. It is
important to note that the locus of this curve is not affected by country size.



































The left hand side of equation (31) is independent of !. Moreover, it rises in '
HF. The
right hand side can be expressed as a function of '
FH: '
FH has to rise in '
HF: By free
entry, '















FH rises and '
HH falls, ! must fall to restore equilibrium. Hence, trade bal-
ance establishes a negative relationship between Home’s export cutoff and the rela-
tive wage.
Consider a country size shock. For a given relative wage, the right hand side of
the trade balance curve must be larger, which can only come about by an increase
in '
HF. Hence, a country size shock shifts the trade balance locus upwards. We also
conclude that the larger country pays a higher wage, which extends Lemma 1 to the
general case.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 2(a)’







F + fd + fxmFH
fe=pin
H + fd + fxmHF
: (33)
We have argued in the proof of Lemma 1’ that a country size shock raises Home’s
export cutoff '
HF. By free entry, Home’s domestic entry cutoff falls. Hence, the de-
nominator of the above expression falls. It follows from equation (32) that Foreign’s
export cutoff '
FH falls since '
HH falls and ! rises. By free entry, '
FF rises. Then, the
numerator of the above equation rises, which implies that the effect of the country
size shock on the relative mass of ﬁrms is magniﬁed.
It is easy to check that MH=MF = =(1   ) > =(1   ) directly translates into
 > ; which constitutes a weak home market effect.
44B Calibration
We use standard results from the literature to calibrate the model at symmetric equi-
librium.29 An important source of information is Bernard et al. (2003): They argue
that  = 3:8 ﬁts their data well and report that the standard deviation of domestic
US plant sales is 0:84. In terms of the Melitz (2003) model, this value has to equal
(   1)=. With the estimate for  at hand, we obtain  = 3:3, which meets the re-
striction  >    1. Moreover, it is close to estimates from other sources.30 According
to Bernard et al. (2003), the export participation rate of US ﬁrms is about 21%.31 Us-
ing  = 1:3, which we take from Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), and the corresponding
values for  and , the implied relative export ﬁxed costs amount to fx=fd = 1:8.
Under this parameter constellation, the freeness of trade is given by   0:38. The
implied conventional sorting amounts to    0:88. Since it is only implicitly deﬁned,
we have to back out 
 from our simulations. The market potential curve is convex,
and a weak HME in demand shares arises.
In the Krugman (1980) model, the share of expenditure on domestic varieties at
symmetric equilibrium is given by
 
1 + ~ 1 ~  1. In the Krugman speciﬁcation, we
choose ~  such that observed trade elasticities are the same, i.e.   = 1  ~  , ~  = 1+

















Our liberalization scenario considers the elimination of variable trade costs in the
Melitz speciﬁcation. In the Krugman speciﬁcation, variable trade costs ~  are com-
puted according to the formula given above. Table 1 summarizes the parameter val-








29We follow Demidova (2008).
30Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) report that the shape parameters for total manufacturing are 3:03
and 2:55 for Italy and France, respectively.
31In Europe, the UK features a similar export participation rate (28%), but German and French
export participation rates are higher; see Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
45C Melitz (2003) with outside sector
Inthisappendix,wederiveequilibriuminthepresenceofanoutsidesector. Weshow
that the economy exhibits a weak and a strong home market effect. As in Helpman
and Krugman (1995), the home market effect is linear in . Moreover, we discuss
welfare implications.
Basic environment. The model is augmented by a homogeneous good produced
under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Utility takes the Cobb-
Douglas form, where  denotes the share of expenditure spent on differentiated vari-
eties. Theoutsidegoodisfreelytradable. Hence, wagesareequalizedandhenceforth
normalized to unity. Welfare per worker is given by the inverse of the aggregate price
index. UsingPi todenotethepriceindexofthedifferentiatedgoodssectoranddeﬁn-
ing ~   (1   )
1  , we can write welfare per worker as
Wi = ~ =P

i :
Equilibrium. The free entry conditions are unaffected. In the zero cutoff proﬁt con-













Hence, we can substitute out export cutoffs from the free entry conditions. We obtain





 = (   1)
 
fd
fe (1 + ):
It is important to note that the cutoff productivity levels do not depend on country
size. Hence, they are symmetric across countries irrespectively of the country size
distribution.
























where i denotes the fraction of workers employed in the differentiated good sector.





where  ri 
P
















46Due to the symmetry of the cutoffs, we henceforth suppress the subscripts of the
revenue terms. Note that  rx= rd reduces to .
Balanced trade is given by
Mi r
x = Mj r
x + (1   )Li   (1   i)Li
where the term on the left hand side represents country i’s exports of the differen-
tiated good. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side represents i’s imports of the dif-
ferentiated good. The remaining terms reﬂect i’s imports of the homogeneous good
(spending on the homogeneous good minus value of domestic homogeneous good
production).
Substituting out Mi and  rij from balanced trade and using  ri =  rj, we obtain
i = 
 r




 rd, i 2 fH;Fg:














2 , i 2 fH;Fg;
Moreover, we have
H > F ,  > 1=2:
Hence, the smaller country is a net exporter of the homogeneous good.
Home market effect. The labor clearing conditions implies that Home’s share of
ﬁrms active in the differentiated good sector can be written as
 =
1





H > F, which constitutes a weak home market effect.
















= 1 + 2
 rx
 rd = 1 + 2 > 1
The following observations stand out. First, the weak HME is linear in . Second,
there exists a strong HME. Third, the HME is magniﬁed by a reduction in trade barri-
ers (HMME).
47Welfare per capita. Using the domestic zero cutoff proﬁt condition, we can rewrite
welfare per worker as










where ~   (1   )
1   is a constant. The following observations stand out. First, a
shock on the relative country size  affects both countries symmetrically. The reason
that domestic entry cutoffs are independent of the country size distribution. Second,
anincreaseinfreenessoftraderisesthedomesticentrycutoffandthereforeincreases
welfareperworkerinbothcountries. Third,anincreaseinthefreenessoftradeleaves
relative welfare per worker unaffected.
48